Operation Wonderland took place from August 16 to 30, 1942, orchestrated by the Kriegsmarine within the vast expanse of the Barents Sea and the Kara Sea, situated along the Arctic coast of the Soviet Union. This operation had a clear objective: to disrupt Soviet shipping along the Northern Sea Route, a crucial maritime pathway hugging the Soviet Arctic coast and leading from the Bering Strait. It represented the initial phase of a broader campaign aimed at establishing naval supremacy in the western Arctic.
The inception of Operation Wonderland was prompted by reports from Japanese naval intelligence, which alerted the German forces to the imminent departure of Convoy EON-18 in 1942. With an eye on leveraging their heavy naval assets safely, the Kriegsmarine's high command explored operational possibilities. On May 5, Admiral Rolf Carls, at the helm of Marinegruppe Nord, instructed Admiral Hubert Schmundt, responsible for German naval operations in northern Norway, to assess the feasibility of deploying heavy cruisers such as Admiral Scheer, Lützow, or Admiral Hipper, which were stationed in the north of Norway, to intercept convoys traversing the Northern Sea Route.
In July, Naval Group North devised a comprehensive strategy suggesting that Admiral Scheer should venture into the Kara Sea, targeting Soviet merchant vessels navigating the Northern Sea Route. Operation Wonderland constituted the inaugural phase of the overarching plan to assert German dominance over the western Arctic Sea, a precursor to Operation Zar.
In their preparation, the German forces had access to critical information on polar ice conditions and the geography of the Kara Sea. This invaluable knowledge was derived from aerial photographs and insights gathered during a notable expedition. The airship Graf Zeppelin had embarked on a historic Polar Flight in July 1931, during which the crew meticulously observed ice conditions and captured aerial photographs, thus furnishing the Germans with essential data for their strategic endeavors.
On May 5, 1942, German Naval Intelligence received crucial intelligence that indicated a substantial transformation in the settlement of Amderma, located on the Kara Sea, just south of Novaya Zemlya. The information disclosed that Amderma had evolved into a significant port with a notable railway connection leading to Vorkuta, extending further into the Soviet Union's hinterland. Further intelligence reports were forthcoming. On June 29, clandestine operatives in Canada relayed the noteworthy news that ships in Vancouver had been laden with wheat, their destination set for Siberia. By July 1, Admiral Carls presented an elaborate proposal, outlining the deployment of Admiral Scheer and Lützow into the Kara Sea. The primary objectives were to intercept vessels traversing the Northern Sea Route, conduct a bombardment of Amderma, and engage any fishing vessels encountered en route.
This plan was indeed accepted by the High Command; however, due to fuel shortages, it was subsequently curtailed to the deployment of Admiral Scheer. The operation was scheduled for mid-August, carefully chosen for its favorable ice conditions, ensuring minimal obstruction. Significant information was also provided by Japanese Naval Intelligence. On July 16, a report indicated that around twenty merchant ships had reportedly arrived at Petropavlovsk, while by July 26, a Japanese report detailed the departure of a substantial convoy, which included Soviet destroyer escorts, traveling northward from the port.
By August 1, it was reported that the convoy had reached the Bering Strait. The German assessment suggested that this convoy would subsequently access the Kara Sea through the Vilkitsky Strait, situated to the south of the Severnaya Zemlya archipelago, on August 15 or 16. Concurrently, German espionage sources notified the German Naval High Command that an eastbound convoy was slated to depart from Arkhangelsk on August 15.
On July 26, the submarine U-601 initiated an attack by bombarding a Russian polar research station situated at Karmakuly on Novaya Zemlya. Additionally, the Soviet merchant vessel Krestyanin was subjected to a submarine attack, resulting in its sinking near the Matochkin Strait, located off Yuzhny Island. Yuzhny Island represents the southernmost island within the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, and this incident took place on August 1.
Concurrently, measures were taken for the concealment and navigation of Admiral Scheer. To access the Kara Sea while maintaining secrecy, a decision was made to pursue a northward route that would lead past Cape Zhelaniya. To facilitate this, on August 11, U-601 departed from Kirkenes with the purpose of inspecting the ice conditions to determine the ice limit.
Simultaneously, U-251 was designated to access the Kara Sea from the south, employing the Yugorsky Strait, which effectively separates Vaygach Island from the Yugorsky Peninsula on the mainland. The operational launch date was set for August 14, a decision influenced by the impending arrival of a low-pressure system. It was strategically aimed for Admiral Scheer to capitalize on the diminished visibility often associated with low-pressure systems, allowing it to traverse the Barents Sea without detection.
Furthermore, the temporary absence of Allied convoys freed additional submarines for Operation Wunderland. Consequently, U-209 was dispatched to monitor the western entrance of the Kara Strait, while U-456 was assigned to patrol the western extremity of the Matochkin Strait. Notably, between August 11 and 17, U-255, in coordination with a BV 138 flying-boat, outfitted with supplementary fuel tanks, conducted reconnaissance missions over the Svalbard Archipelago.
Additionally, U-435 was tasked with delivering the weather station party known as Knospe to the islands within the archipelago. The primary purpose of this operation was to provide essential weather information to support naval operations against vessels navigating along the Northern Sea Route.
Finally, by August 15, U-601 had reported that the ice limit extended approximately 190 kilometers northward from Cape Zhelaniya, indicating vital information that would inform subsequent actions.
On August 16, 1942, Admiral Scheer commenced its journey from Narvik, escorted by the destroyers Friedrich Eckoldt, Erich Steinbrinck, and Richard Beitzen. Initially, the fleet sailed southward as a strategic ploy to deceive the British, after which the destroyers altered their course towards Tromsø. Weather conditions at the time were favorably conducive to concealment, marked by inclement storms and low visibility.
A planned rendezvous with U-601 was scheduled just after midnight on the 18th of August. Captain Grau, in command of U-601, reported that the route eastwards into the Kara Sea was devoid of ice obstructions, and no aircraft or ships had been observed in the vicinity. Consequently, Grau steered southward to undertake a patrol mission near the mouths of the Ob and Yenisey rivers, both of which represent significant waterways emptying into the Arctic Ocean.
Admiral Scheer advanced past Cape Zhelaniya, located at the northern extremity of Novaya Zemlya, marking the demarcation between the Barents Sea and the Kara Sea. Navigating eastward through challenging pack ice, two reconnaissance sorties were executed by the Arado seaplanes to identify the clearest path forward. Subsequently, to extricate itself from the ice, the cruiser briefly veered westward before assuming a south-eastward course along the periphery of the pack ice.
In the morning of August 20, Admiral Scheer successfully rendezvoused with U-251. The U-boat confirmed that no ships had been sighted but pointed out that funnel smoke emanating from Admiral Scheer was observable at a range of 32 kilometers. U-251 subsequently altered its course to the south, while Admiral Scheer continued on a south-eastward trajectory, making its way toward the Laptev Sea with the intention of ambushing coastal maritime traffic.
Few days later on August 20, the crew aboard the Arado aircraft spotted three separate groups of Soviet ships in the vicinity of Kravkov Island, part of the Mona Islands. Their reconnaissance efforts, however, were impeded by the presence of dense fog, resulting in Admiral Scheer losing track of the convoys. In addition, a landing mishap compelled the cruiser to sink the Arado aircraft. Unfavorable weather conditions characterized by fog and drifting ice floes hindered the ship's approach. Upon reaching the Mona Islands, the Russian ships had already departed.
Five days later, a ship, identified as the icebreaker Sibiryakov, was spotted. The German forces approached the vessel with the aim of capturing its codes and ciphers, enabling them to intercept Russian wireless messages concerning ice conditions near the Vilkitsky Strait. However, a case of mistaken identity transpired as the Russians believed Admiral Scheer, which was approaching head-on, to be the American cruiser USS Tuscaloosa. Acting on his suspicions, Kacharava, the Russian captain, ordered his crew to assume battle stations and directed the ship towards Beluga Island, situated to the south of Cape Dikson and northeast of the Vkhodnoy Strait near Vkhodnoy Island.
In an attempt to send a distress signal stating, "Have sighted an unknown auxiliary cruiser which is closing with us; please watch this channel" to Dikson, the Russians encountered interference from the B-Dienst operators aboard Admiral Scheer, who managed to disrupt the signal. The situation escalated as the German cruiser issued a stern command to the Russian ship, demanding, "Lower your flag and surrender," accompanied by a warning shot. Sibiryakov's gunners promptly returned fire, but they were overwhelmingly outmatched. Admiral Scheer unleashed six salvos and scored four direct hits on Sibiryakov, engulfing the Russian ship in flames. As Sibiryakov began to sink, the Germans dispatched a boat with a boarding party to retrieve codebooks and other documents. Tragically, Kacharava had issued an order to Engineer Bochurko to open the seacocks, and Bochurko carried out this directive, eventually perishing with the vessel.
B-Dienst intercepted a broadcast warning all Soviet ships in the Kara Sea about an unidentified German vessel operating in the area. This development eliminated the element of surprise for Meendsen-Bohlken's mission. Fearing possible aerial attacks, Meendsen-Bohlken decided to move the cruiser away from the Taymyr Peninsula. Unfavorable northwesterly winds persisted, leading to the accumulation of ice at the mouth of the Vilkitsky Strait. Following the loss of the Arado aircraft, any plans for an attack on the convoy near this location had to be abandoned.
The extensive volume of wireless communications intercepted by the B-Dienst team indicated the significance of Dikson as a crucial base for the western end of the Northern Sea Route. In an effort to disrupt these convoys and gather essential ice-related data that could further Wunderland's objectives, Meendsen-Bohlken made the decision to target the port. Consequently, the cruiser headed southward on August 26.
At that time, the Germans remained unaware that Ivan Papanin, the head of the Chief Directorate of the Northern Sea Route, had requested reinforcement for Dikson's defenses when the war commenced. As Admiral Scheer came into sight, the navigation station at Skuratov, located approximately 7.2 kilometers from the port, was the first to detect the cruiser's presence. Meendsen-Bohlken had organized a landing party of 180 men, aiming for a landing spot as close as possible to the Glavsevmorput offices to minimize the time during which the party could be engaged by opposition before reaching the shore. The Germans anticipated limited resistance, primarily expecting some light artillery fire from merchant vessels and the shore garrison. However, they unexpectedly encountered the Soviet armored ship from the Northern Fleet, leading to an exchange of fire. Dezhnev sustained several hits, but the armor-piercing shells merely penetrated the hull without causing critical damage.
The German cruiser Admiral Scheer switched to high explosive ammunition, which quickly led to significant damage, including breaches below the waterline. This attack resulted in six crew members killed, one mortally wounded, and twenty others wounded. In response, Dezhnev initiated a smokescreen and steered towards Samoletnaya Bay to find shelter. Meanwhile, Admiral Scheer adjusted its aim and managed to strike the Revolyutsioner three times despite the smokescreen, setting the ship ablaze, severing the steam pipe, and disabling the anchor winch, effectively anchoring the vessel in place. Kara enjoyed some protection from the nearby shore and the smokescreen, but it soon came under fire from the 152 mm guns. The shots caused water columns to rise near Admiral Scheer. In response, Admiral Scheer deployed another smokescreen and circled around Cape Anvil, heading north along Dikson Island. During this maneuver, the cruiser bombarded the weather station on Great Bear Island for approximately five minutes.
Having expended 20 percent of the ship's ammunition and with continued heavy Russian fire, Meendsen-Bohlken decided to intensify the use of smokescreens. The cruiser then veered to starboard and headed back into the Kara Sea, as it became crucial to conserve ammunition. B-Dienst intercepted a Soviet communication indicating that the Kuibyshev had been sunk, leading to the mistaken belief that the vessel had been located within the harbor. In reality, the ship had been sunk on August 24 by U-601 to the northwest of Dikson. The actual damage caused by the bombardment was significantly less extensive than what the Germans had initially assumed. Both the Revolyutsioner and the Dezhnev were operational again within three days, and subsequently, the icebreakers Litke and Taimyr journeyed to Port Dudinka.
While Admiral Scheer had suffered minimal, if any, damage, the Russians only needed to temporarily suspend their convoys, and the natural icing of the Kara Sea would ultimately compel the raider to withdraw or risk becoming trapped. Recognizing this predicament, Meendsen-Bohlken requested permission for a delay to conduct a sweep south of the Franz Joseph Archipelago towards Svalbard. However, this request was denied, and Admiral Scheer began its journey back.
On August 29, the destroyers Friedrich Eckoldt, Erich Steinbrinck, and Richard Beitzen were dispatched to rendezvous with Admiral Scheer near Bear Island. They then escorted the cruiser back to Kirkenes, with the return voyage completed by August 30. Shortly after Admiral Scheer's return, British reconnaissance aircraft spotted the cruiser, prompting the Soviet authorities to announce that shipping in the Kara and Barents seas was no longer under threat from surface ships.
Operation Wonderland (Unternehmen Wunderland) can be considered a modest success. Due to adverse weather conditions and the prevalence of ice floes, Admiral Scheer did not venture beyond the Vilkitsky Strait. Its impact was limited to shipping in the Barents Sea and the Kara Sea. By the end of August, Admiral Scheer's mission concluded, and U-boat operations were halted by mid-September as the sea surface began to freeze over, especially in the Kara Sea, which tends to freeze earlier due to the absence of the warmer Atlantic currents. The Soviet navy had failed to intercept Admiral Scheer, partly due to the delayed information from Glavsevmorput, the organization overseeing shipping in the Kara Sea, which took 36 hours to notify the Northern Fleet HQ.